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This paper explores the effects of tariffs, trade costs, and firing costs on firm dynamics and labor markets
outcomes. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium model with labor market search frictions,
wage bargaining, firing costs, firm-specific productivity shocks, and endogenous entry/exit decisions.
Firing costs reduce firms' profits and discourage them from quickly adjusting their employment levels
in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Tariffs and other trade costs reduce rents for efficient firms and
increase rents for inefficient firms, as in Melitz (2003). These well-known effects interact with idiosyncratic
productivity shocks and with scale economies in hiring costs to determine the equilibrium size distribution
of firms, entry/exit rates, job turnover rates, rate of informality, and cross-firm wage distributions.
After fitting this model to Colombian micro data on establishments and households, we use counter-
factual simulations to isolate the effects of that country's trade liberalization and labor market reforms
circa 1990. We find that Colombia's tariff cuts, in isolation, would have shifted jobs toward large,
stable firms, reducing job turnover and informality in the long run. Further, since firms pay higher
wages when they wish to rapidly expand, the shift of jobs toward such firms would have compressed
the top end of the wage distribution. On the other hand, Colombia's firing costs reductions, in isolation,
would have led some large inefficient producers to contract, driving up job turnover rates and informality.
Finally, however, the combination of tariff cuts and reduced firing costs that was implemented led
to larger increases in turnover and informality than would have occurred if tariffs had been held fixed.
The reason is that reduced firing costs made firms adjust their sales more dramatically in response
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Job insecurity, high unemployment, large informal sectors, and wage inequality are long-
standing concerns in Latin America. During the 1990s, following a wave of trade liberalization
episodes and labor market reforms, these problems grew worse for many countries in the
region.1 But the extent to which trade and labor policy reforms contributed to deteriorating
labor market conditions remains an open question. Several other forces were also in play,
including skill-biased technological change, privatization, and macroeconomic shocks (Inter-
American Development Bank (2004)).
To better isolate the e⁄ects of openness and labor market policies on workers in these
countries, we formulate a dynamic structural model of trade with labor market frictions.
Then we ￿t our model to plant-level panel data and household survey data from Colombia￿ a
country that substantially reduced tari⁄s and ￿ring costs during the late 1980s and early
1990s. Finally, we use counterfactual simulations to estimate the e⁄ects of tari⁄ reductions,
better access to foreign markets, and reductions in ￿ring costs on job turnover patterns and
the wage distribution.
Openness a⁄ects labor markets in our model because it increases rents for e¢ cient ￿rms
and reduces rents for ine¢ cient ￿rms, as in Melitz (2003). And reductions in ￿ring costs
encourage ￿rms to quickly adjust their employment levels in response to supply or demand
shocks, as in Ljungqvist (2002) and Pissarides (2000). These well-known e⁄ects interact with
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, search frictions, and scale economies in worker recruitment
to induce adjustments in the equilibrium job turnover rate, unemployment rate, and wage
distribution as policy reforms are implemented.
1 Inter-American Development Bank (2004) summarizes the deterioration in Latin American labor market
conditions and notes that "Between the mid-1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, countries in Latin America
began trade liberalization programs, with reductions of at least 15 percentage points in the average tari⁄rate,
which fell from an average of 48.9 percent in the pre-reform years to 10.7 percent in 1999." (p. 137). Heckman
and Pages (2004) survey labor market regulations in Latin America, observing that "the new openness to
international trade increased the demand for labor market ￿ exibility." They point to Argentina, Colombia,
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru as examples of countries that ￿t this pattern. Haltiwanger et al (2004) document
the association between job turnover and openness in Latin America. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) survey the
evidence linking openness to wage inequality and informality in Latin America and other developing regions.Our model shares some features with a number of recent trade models that describe the
e⁄ects of openness on labor markets in static settings (Helpman and Itskhoki (2010); Helpman
et al (2010); Egger and Kreickemeier (2007); Amiti and Davis (2008); Davis and Harrigan
(2008)); Felbermayr et al (2008).2 In particular, it embodies Melitz￿ s (2003) basic insight that
openness compounds the advantages enjoyed by relatively e¢ cient ￿rms. However we depart
from this literature in two fundamental ways. First, we assume that ￿rms experience ongoing,
idiosyncratic productivity shocks (as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993)), and they respond by adjusting their vacancy postings, lay-o⁄s and exit decisions (as in
Bertola and Caballero (1994), Bertola and Garibaldi (2001), and Koeniger and Prat (2007)).3
Second, we ￿t our model to micro data and use it to perform counterfactual experiments. In
addition to characterizing the e⁄ects of trade and labor policies on workers at di⁄erent types
of ￿rms, this exercise yields ￿ndings on the magnitude of vacancy posting costs, the costs of
creating a new ￿rm, and various other parameters of interest.
While we do not pretend to capture all of the channels through which openness and ￿ring
costs can a⁄ect labor market outcomes, our focus on ￿rm-level entry, exit and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks is supported by existing empirical evidence on the sources of job turnover
and wage heterogeneity. Studies of job creation and job destruction invariably ￿nd that
most reallocation is due to idiosyncratic (rather than industry-wide) adjustments (Davis et
al (1998), Roberts (1996), Inter-American Development Bank (2004)). ￿This is true even
in Latin America￿ s highly volatile macro environment￿where producer entry and exit alone
account for 30-40 percent of job creation and destruction (Inter-American Development Bank
2Several less-related linkages between openness and labor market outcomes have been modeled in the recent
trade literature. One strand of this literature emphasizes the changes in skill-premia and/or unemployment
rates that result from trade-induced changes in the relative demand for di⁄erent types of labor (e.g., Albrecht
and Vroman (2002), Yeaple (2005), Davidson et al (2008)). Another characterizes the adjustments in wages,
unemployment and labor turnover patterns that derive from trade-induced changes in sectoral output prices
(e.g., Kambourov (2009), Artuc, Chaudhuri and McClaren (2010)). And ￿nally, some studies have focussed
on cross-country di⁄erences in the ￿ exibility of labor markets as a source of comparative advantage (Davidson
et al (1999), Cunat and Melitz (2007), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)).
3Other recent papers that study ￿rm dynamics and labor market frictions in a closed economy context
include Cooper et al (2007), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), and Hobijn and Sahin (2010). Utar (2008) studies
￿rm dynamics and labor market fricttions in an import-competing industry that takes the wage rate as given.
2(2004), chapter 2). Further, as Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) note, if openness has had a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on job ￿ ows, it has mainly been through intra-sectoral e⁄ects: ￿Most studies
of trade liberalization in developing countries ￿nd little evidence in support of [trade-induced
labor] reallocation across sectors.￿Finally, while cross-worker di⁄erences in wages are obvi-
ously partly due to di⁄erences in worker characteristics, much is attributable to labor market
frictions and ￿rm heterogeneity.4
2 The Model
The model extends Bertola and Cabellero (1994), Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) and Koeniger
and Prat (2007) to a general equilibrium setting with fully articulated product markets, inter-
national trade, arbitrary (stationary) Markov processes for productivity shocks and endoge-
nous ￿rm entry and exit.
2.1 Preferences
We consider an economy populated by a ￿xed supply of homogeneous, in￿nitely-lived worker-
consumers who purchase two types of output: homogeneous services and di⁄erentiated indus-














where r is the rate of time preference, sc
t is consumption of services, and qc
t is an index of











(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿￿￿; (1)
4Studying data from France and the United States, Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002) show
that roughly half of the cross-worker variation in compensation in French workers is due to employer e⁄ects.
Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) use matched employer-employee data from Brazil and ￿nd that establishment
￿xed e⁄ects constitute a smaller share of overall wage variation in Brazil compared to France and the United
States.


















Here Nt measures the mass of di⁄erentiated good varieties at time t, qc
t(n) is consumption of
good n at time t and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Services are non-traded, but NF of the Nt di⁄erentiated goods are produced abroad. Sup-
pressing time subscripts, and letting pF(n) be the foreign-currency denominated f.o.b. price of





where k is the price of foreign currency, (￿c￿1) is the iceberg transport cost per unit shipped
and (￿m ￿ 1) is the ad valorem tari⁄ rate on imports. Similarly, letting pH(n) be the price of





Several normalizations simplify notation. First, since the set of available foreign varieties





choice of foreign currency units. This allows us to write the exact price index for the composite







Second, without loss of generality we choose the price of services to be our numeraire.


















imported variety n0. Aggregating over worker-consumers, these expressions in turn imply that










where DH = ￿P ￿￿1 R 1
0 Iidi and the mass of domestic worker-consumers is normalized to








Hi(n)di = DH [￿m￿ckpF(n)]
￿￿ : (5)
42.2 Production Technologies
Services are supplied by service-sector ￿rms and, less e¢ ciently, by unemployed workers en-
gaged in home production. Regardless of their source, services are produced with labor alone,
homogeneous across suppliers, and sold in competitive product markets. Firms that supply
services use a common constant returns technology, and face no hiring or ￿ring costs. So with
an appropriate choice of output units we may write their combined supply of services as
S = LS; (6)
where LS is labor employed in the service sector: Workers who home-produce service goods
each generate b < 1 units of output.
Industrial goods cannot be home-produced. They must be supplied by industrial-sector
￿rms, which pay a sunk start-up cost to initiate production of a single variety of output. Each
￿rm produces its output using labor alone and competes in the monopolistically competitive
product market. Unlike service-sector ￿rms, suppliers of industrial goods are subject to ongo-
ing idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and they must create costly vacancies in order to attract
new workers. (As in Melitz (2003), productivity variation can equally well be thought of as
variation in product appeal.) In the industrial sector, output of producers with productivity
level z is given by
q(z;l) = zl
￿; (7)
where l is the labor input and ￿ > 0. Productivity is ￿rm-speci￿c, independent across ￿rms,
and serially correlated. Its evolution is characterized by the transition density h(z0jz), which
is common to all ￿rms. Productivity shocks together with ￿rms￿employment policies and
entry/exit policies determine the steady state distribution of ￿rms across (z;l); which we
denote by f(z;l):
Producer dynamics in the industrial sector resemble those in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) in that ￿rms react to their productivity shocks by optimally hiring, ￿ring or exiting.
5Also, new ￿rms enter whenever their expected future pro￿t stream exceeds the entry costs they
face. However, unlike Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), we assume hiring in the industrial
sector is subject to search frictions captured by a standard matching function. Labor market
frictions generate rents that are bargained over between worker and ￿rms, and ￿rms end up
paying di⁄erent wages depending on their current productivity and labor force, as well as
whether they are hiring or ￿ring workers. Further, workers maximize the present value of
their expected welfare by making forward-looking decisions concerning which sector to work
in and what job o⁄ers to accept. We now describe the functioning of labor markets in more
detail.
2.3 Labor Markets and the Matching Technology
The service sector labor market is frictionless so, given that the price of services is unity, the
service sector wage is ws = 1. Search frictions make things more complicated in the industrial
sector. Each period the number of new matches between unemployed workers and vacancy
posting ￿rms is given by
M(V;Lu) =
V Lu
(V ￿ + L￿
u)1=￿;
where Lu is the measure of unemployed workers searching in industrial sector and V is the







(V ￿ + L￿
u)1=￿;






(V ￿ + L￿
u)1=￿:
Each worker decides whether to participate in the industrial labor market at the beginning
of each period. Those who are already employed in the industrial sector can continue with
5The functional form of the matching function follows den Haan et al. (2000). It is constant returns to
scale, and increasing in both arguments. In contrast to the standard Cobb-Douglas form, it has no scale
parameter and the implied matching rates are bounded between zero and one.
6their current job unless their employer lays them o⁄ or shuts down entirely. (They can
also quit in order to move to the service sector or to search for other industrial sector jobs,
although in equilibrium none ￿nd it optimal to do so.) Those not currently employed in the
industrial sector￿ including those who just lost their jobs at contracting or exiting ￿rms￿
can forego certain employment with a service sector ￿rm in order to search for a higher-
wage industrial sector job, but they risk remaining unemployed if they fail to match with an
industrial sector producer.6 Those who end up unemployed subsist during the current period
by home-producing services.
Each period, industrial sector ￿rms decide whether to exit, ￿re some workers, maintain
their existing work force, or hire workers. Firms that shed labor pay a ￿ring cost cf per
worker dismissed, and they pay the workers they retain wages that are determined by Nash
Bargaining. Firms that post vacancies ￿ll them at a rate determined by labor market tightness,
then they too bargain with their employees to determine wages. Finally, given the service
sector technology (6), workers who opted for employment in the service sector are employed
with certainty at the wage ws = 1, and workers who sought industrial sector jobs but failed
to ￿nd them home-produce services at a wage of b.
2.4 Incumbent Firm￿ s Problem
We now describe the ￿rm￿ s problem in more detail. Given the demand function (4) and the
production function (7), any ￿rm in state (z;l) that sells some fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of its output




H [(1 ￿ ￿)zl
￿](
￿￿1
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6The notion that workers trade job security in a low wage sector for the opportunity to search in a higher
wage sector traces back at least to the Harris and Todaro (1970) model.
7where DF = ￿
￿ ￿ PF
￿￿￿1 IF , ￿ PF is the exact price index for industrial goods available abroad
and IF is foreign income, both expressed in foreign currency. We assume the home country is
too small to in￿ uence foreign market aggregates, so IF and ￿ PF are exogenous to the model.
There are no start-up costs or adjustment costs associated with exporting, so ￿rms choose
￿ each period to maximize their total current sales revenues, net of ￿xed exporting costs, cx:
The associated revenue function is
s(z;l) = max
￿2[0;1]
fsH(z;l;￿) + sF(z;l;￿) ￿ cxI
x(z;l)g; (9)
where sH(z;l;￿) is the revenue generated by selling (1￿￿)zl￿ units of output in the domestic
market, and Ix(z;l) is an indicator function that takes a value of unity when ￿ > 0. Whether
the latter occurs simply depends upon zl￿; since the gains from foreign market participation
increase monotonically with production. Given foreign market participation, optimal fraction









Embedded in our general equilibrium model, this standard revenue function delivers a
number of desirable features. First, it implies that for any given (z;l), the marginal revenue
product of labor is larger when the economy is open. This is the underlying reason that
productivity shocks induce larger adjustments in vacancy postings or ￿rings when foreign
markets are accessible. Second, since larger revenues at a given (z;l) mean more surplus to
bargain over, it is also the reason that the wage paid by a ￿rm that exports in state (z;l) is
higher than what it is in the closed economy equilibrium. This result is consistent with the
empirical ￿nding that, controlling for employment, exporters pay higher wages (Bernard and
Jensen (1999)). Third, combined with the fact that search frictions make marginal costs vary
across ￿rms with identical z values, it explains why productive e¢ ciency is a noisy predictor
for exporting status.7 Fourth, re-interpreting z shocks to be product appeal indices rather
7This fact has attracted some attention recently. Hallak and Sividasan (2008) explain it by assuming that
(1) ￿rms di⁄er in terms of both their quality and their productivity e¢ ciency, and (2) exporting requires that
￿rms meet a minimum quality standard.
8than productivity indices, it explains why exporters manage to be larger than non-exporters,
even though they charge higher prices and pay higher wages.8 Finally, this expression implies
that ￿rms￿exporting status a⁄ects their total revenue for a given amount of labor and a
given productivity level. Thus, it provides a new interpretation for the common ￿nding
that measured productivity￿ i.e., de￿ ated revenue per unit input bundle￿ is higher among
exporters.9
When choosing employment levels, ￿rms weigh the associated revenue stream against wage
costs, the e⁄ects of changes in l on the their continuation value, current ￿ring and hiring costs.









where ch and ￿1 > 1 are positive parameters.10 The parameter ￿2 2 [0;1] determines the
strength of scale economies in hiring. If ￿2 = 0; there are no economies of scale and the cost
of posting v vacancies is the same for all ￿rms. On the other hand if ￿2 = 1; the cost of a
given employment growth rate is the same for all ￿rms. For any any ￿2 > 0; a given number
of vacancies cost less for larger ￿rms.
Firms in our model are large in the sense that cross-￿rm variation in realized arrival rates
is ignorable. That is, all ￿rms ￿ll the same fraction ￿f of their posted vacancies. It follows
that expansion from l to l0 simply requires the posting of v = l0￿l
￿f vacancies, and we can write
8Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) note that this pattern could alternatively be due to complementarities in
production between worker ability and product quality.
9The reason this result emerges is that labor market frictions prevent ￿rms from freely expanding as
exporting opportunities arise. In support of this interpretation, De Loecker and Warzynski (2009) report
evidence that mark-ups are higher among exporting ￿rms.
10This speci￿cation generalizes Nilsena et al (2007), who set ￿2 = 1 ￿ 1=￿1: See also Monika and Yashiv
2003, and Yashiv 2006. As discussed in Bertola and Caballero (1994) ￿convexity is necessary to obtain a
well-de￿ned vacancy-posting equilibrium when productivity is heterogeneous across ￿rms, as ￿rms with high
productivity and low employment levels would want to post in￿nitely many vacancies for arbitrarily short
intervals of time if such policies were not made prohibitively costly.￿















Clearly, when labor markets are slack, hiring is less costly because each vacancy is relatively
likely to be ￿lled.
When a ￿rm reduces its workforce from to l0 < l; it incurs ￿ring costs equal to
Cf(l;l
0) = cf(l ￿ l
0):
All labor adjustment costs are in terms of the service good.11 Note, however, that ￿ring
costs are proportional to the number of workers ￿red, so ￿rms have no incentive to downsize
gradually. Also, as will be discussed below, it is possible that a ￿rm will ￿nd itself in a position
where the marginal worker reduces operating pro￿ts, but it is more costly to ￿re her than
retain her.
Regardless of whether a ￿rm is expanding, contracting, or remaining at the same employ-
ment level, we assume that it bargains with each of its workers individually and continuously.
This ensures, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Cahuc and Wasner (2000), and Cahuc, Marque,
and Wasmer (2008) that all workers at a given ￿rm are paid the same wage at a given point
in time. Details of the resulting wage schedules are deferred to section 2.7 below.
To derive ￿rms￿optimal employment policies, we ￿rst specify the sequencing of events
within each period (Figure 1). An incumbent ￿rm enters the current period with the produc-
tivity z and work force l levels that were determined in the previous period. Immediately the
￿rm decides whether to stay in business or to exit. If it stays, it proceeds to an interim stage
in which it observes its current-period productivity realization z0. Then, taking stock of its
updated state, (z0;l); the relevant wage schedules, and the sector-wide worker arrival rate, ￿f,
it chooses its current period work force, l0. If the ￿rm decides to hire (l0 > l) workers, they
are immediately available to produce output in the current period. If it ￿res workers (l0 ￿ l)
11As is standard in the literature (see Ljungqvist (2002) for a review), we assume that ￿ring costs take the
form of a resource cost and are not pure transfers from ￿rms to workers.
10Figure 1: Within-period Sequencing of Events for Firms
it clears them from the payroll prior to production, although it incurs ￿ring costs Cf(l;l0).
Finally, revenues accrue and wages and other costs are paid at the end of the period.
Given the presence of search frictions, workers at hiring ￿rms generate rents, and these are
bargained over to determine wages. However, the marginal worker at a ￿ring ￿rm creates no
rents and has no bargaining power. Hence expanding ￿rms face di⁄erent wage schedules from
contracting or constant-employment ￿rms, and current operating pro￿ts depend upon both l
and l0. More precisely, de￿ning wh(z0;l0) to be the wage function faced by a hiring ￿rm and






s(z0;l0) ￿ wh(z0;l0)l0 ￿ cp if l0 > l
s(z0;l0) ￿ wf(z0;l0)l0 ￿ cp otherwise.
(11)
where cp, the per-period ￿xed cost of operation, is common to all ￿rms.















where the max of the term in square brackets is the value of the ￿rm in the interim state




Ch (l;l0); if l0 > l;
Cf (l;l0); otherwise. :









1; if L(z0;l) > l;
0; otherwise. ; (14)




1; if V(z;l) > 0
0; otherwise. : (15)
2.5 Entry
In the steady state, a constant (endogenous) fraction ￿exit of ￿rms exits the industry. These
￿rms are replaced by an equal number of entrants, who ￿nd it optimal to pay a sunk entry cost
of ce and create new ￿rms. Upon creating their ￿rms, these entrants acquire le > 0 workers
and learn their initial productivity, which is drawn from the ergodic distribution of the Markov
process governing incumbents￿productivity. We denote this density function by fe(z) and we
assume it is identical to the ergodic z distribution implied by h(z0jz). The search costs for the
initial le workers are included in ce: Thereafter entrants behave exactly like incumbent ￿rms in
the interim stage (see Figure 1), with their interim state given by (z;le). So by the time they
begin producing, most new entrants have adjusted their workforce (subject to search costs)




V(z;le)fe(z)dz ￿ ce; (16)
which holds with equality if there is a positive mass of entrants, M.
122.6 Worker￿ s Problem
Figure 2 presents the intra-period timing of events for workers. Consider ￿rst a worker who
is employed by an industrial ￿rm in state (z;l) at the beginning of the current period. This
worker learns immediately whether her ￿rm will continue operating. If it shuts down, she
joins the pool of industrial job seekers (enters state u) in the interim stage. Otherwise, she
enters the interim stage as an employee of the same ￿rm that she worked for in the previous
period. (No one voluntarily quits because, in equilibrium, ￿rms always pay their workers at
least their reservation wage.) Her ￿rm then realizes its new productivity level z0 and enters
the interim state (z0;l): At this point her ￿rm decides whether to hire workers. If it expands
its workforce to l0 > l, she earns wh(z0;l0); and she is positioned to start the next period in
state (z0;l0): If the ￿rm contracts or remains at the same employment level, she either loses
her job and reverts to state u or she retains her job, earns wf(z0;l0), and starts next period in
state (z0;l0): All workers at contracting ￿rms are equally likely to be laid o⁄, so each loses her
job with probability pf = (l ￿ l0)=l.
Workers in state u are searching for industrial jobs. They are hired by entering and
expanding ￿rms that post vacancies. If they are matched with a ￿rm, they receive the same
wage as those who were already employed by the ￿rm. If they are not matched, they support
themselves by joining the informal sector and home-producing b 2 [0;1) units of the service
good. At the start of the next period, they can choose to work in the service sector (enter
state s) or look for a job in the industrial sector (remain in state u): Likewise, workers who
start the current period in the service sector choose between continuing to work at the service
wage ws = 1 and entering the pool of industrial job-seekers. As these workers have the option
to choose either labor market, they are said to be in state o:
We now specify the value functions for the workers in the interim stage. Going to the
service sector generates an end-of-period income of 1 and returns a worker to the o state at
13Figure 2: Within-period Sequencing of Events for Workers







Searching in the industrial sector exposes workers to the risk of spending the period unem-
ployed, supporting themselves by home-producing b units of the service good. But it also
opens the possibility of landing in a high-value job. Since the probability of ￿nding a match












h is the expected value of matching with a hiring ￿rm.
The value of the sectoral choice is Jo = maxfJs;Jug and, ruling out equilibria without





14Combined with (17), this condition implies that Jo; Js; and Ju are all equal to 1=r:
The expected value of matching with an industrial job, EJe
h; depends on the distribution
of hiring ￿rms and the value of the jobs they o⁄er. For workers who match with a hiring ￿rm













where l0 = L(z0;l) and Je(z0;l0) is the value of being employed at an industrial ￿rm in state
(z0;l0) at the start of the next period. Accordingly, the expected value of a match for a worker





















l v(z0;l)e f(z0;l)dldz0: (22)
Here v(z0;l) = Ih(z0;l)[L(z0;l) ￿ l]=￿f gives the number of vacancies posted by a ￿rm in
interim state (z0;l); and e f(z0;l) is the interim stage unconditional density of ￿rms over (z0;l).
(The latter density is generally distinct from the end-of-period stationary distribution of ￿rms,
f(z;l).)
It remains to specify the value of starting the period matched with an industrial ￿rm,
Je(z;l), which appears in (20) above. The value of being at a ￿rm that exits immediately is
simply the value of being unemployed, Ju: This is also the value of being at a non-hiring ￿rm,
since workers at these ￿rms are indi⁄erent between being ￿red and retained. Hence Je(z;l)






















We now characterize the wage schedules. Consider ￿rst a hiring ￿rm. After hiring ￿rms have
posted their vacancies and matching has taken place, the labor market closes. Firms then
bargain with their workers simultaneously and on a one-to-one basis, treating each worker
as the marginal one. At this point vacancy posting costs are already sunk and workers who
walk away from the bargaining table cannot be replaced in the current period. Similarly, if
an agreement between ￿rm and the worker is not reached, the worker remains unemployed in
the current period. These timing assumptions create rents to be split between the ￿rm and
the worker.
As detailed in Appendix 1, it follows that the wage schedule for hiring ￿rms with an
end-of-period state (z0;l0) is given by12
wh(z
0;l
0) = (1 ￿ ￿)r
b + Jo
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￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)
:
In (24), rb+Jo
1+r is the ￿ ow value of unemployment for a worker who is bargaining with a
￿rm at the end of the period, ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the bargaining power of the ￿rm, Pf(z0;l0)
is the probability of being ￿red next period. Worker in hiring ￿rms get the marginal product
of labor plus (1 ￿ ￿) share of their outside option, while part of the ￿ring cost is passed to
them as lower wages.13
The marginal worker at a non-hiring ￿rm generates no rents, so the ￿ring wage just matches
12This expression is analogous to equation (9) in Koeniger and Prat (2007).
13As in Bartelo and Cabellero (1994), wages decline in ￿rms￿employment (l0), holding productivity (z) ￿xed.
This re￿ ects the diminishing marginal revenue product of labor, and induces ￿rms to hoard labor and thereby
by workers￿wages low. Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2008) discuss conditions under which overemployment
result might hold at the macroeconomic level.









Three assumptions lie behind this formulation. First, workers who quit do not trigger ￿ring
costs for their employers. They thus enjoy no bargaining power when, at their reservation
wage, they contribute nothing to their employer￿ s expected pro￿t stream. Second, ￿rms
cannot use mixed strategies when bargaining with workers. Finally, workers who are ￿red
are randomly chosen after the bargaining stage. The ￿rst assumption ensures that workers at
contracting ￿rms are paid no more than the reservation wage, and the remaining assumptions
prevent ￿rms from avoiding ￿ring costs by paying less than reservation wages those workers
they wish to shed.
Importantly, wf(z0;l0) does vary across ￿rms, since those workers who continue with a
￿ring ￿rm may enjoy higher wages next period. This option to continue has positive value
(captured by the bracketed term in (25)), so ￿ring ￿rms may pay their workers less than the
￿ ow value of being unemployed.
3 Equilibrium
Five basic conditions characterize our equilibrium. First, the distribution of ￿rms over (z;l)
states reproduces itself each period through the Markov processes on z, the policy functions
(including hiring, ￿ring, entry and exit), and the productivity draws that ￿rms receive upon
entry. Second, supply matches demand for services and for each di⁄erentiated good, where
supplies are determined by employment and productivity levels in each type of good. Third,
the ￿ ow of workers into unemployment matches the ￿ ow of workers out of unemployment￿ that
is, the Beveridge condition holds. Fourth, aggregate income matches aggregate expenditure,
so trade is balanced. Fifth, workers optimally choose the sector in which they are working or
seeking work. Appendix 2 provides further details.
174 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 An Application to Colombia
To explore the implications of our model, we use a combination of econometric estimation and
calibration techniques to ￿t it to Colombian data. This country suits our purposes for several
reasons. First, Colombia underwent a signi￿cant trade liberalization during the late 1980s
and early 1990s, reducing its average nominal tari⁄ rate from 21.5 percent to 11.3 percent
(Table 1). Second, Colombia also implemented labor market reforms in 1990 that substantially
reduced ￿ring costs.14 Third, despite stable average unemployment rates, these reforms were
associated with an increase in job turnover rates from 21 percent to 23 percent, an increase
in informal self-employment from 17.8 to 20.7, and an increase of 8 percent in the ratio of
wages at the 90th percentile to wages at the 10th percentile, controlling for observable worker
characteristics (Table 1). These patterns are typical of Latin American experiences. Finally,
there was no wave of privatization in Colombia during the sample period, and although the
country did experience some macro shocks, they were relatively mild. Thus the consequences
of Colombia￿ s liberalization and labor market reforms are relatively likely to come through in
its data.
4.2 The Revenue Function and Productivity Process
The job turnover and unemployment/informality documented in Table 1 help us to calibrate
our model, as we will discuss shortly. But the parameters that characterize the revenue
function and the productivity process can be estimated econometrically using Colombia￿ s
14Kugler (1999) summarizes the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990 as follows. "Prior to the reform,
employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year worked based on the salary at the time of
separation (9.3% of the salary at the time of separation). . . . After 1990, employers were, instead, required to
make a monthly contribution of 9.3% of the present salary to a capitalised fund, which would be accessible to
the worker in the event of separation. The change in the legislation . . . eliminated the additional cost implied
by the fact that, prior to the reform, the severance pay was based on the salary at the time of separation
rather than on the current salary during each month. . . . [It also] reduced severance payments by eliminating
the possibility for employees to withdraw funds for investments in education and housing which would only
be credited to the employer in nominal terms at the time of separation. Finally, . . . [it] turned severance
payments into a deferred compensation scheme." (p. 391)
18Table 1: Trade Reforms and Labor Market Outcomes in Colombia*
Variable pre-1990 post-1990
Average nominal import tari⁄ 21.50 11.30
Firing costs per worker (as a multiple of monthly wages) 17 13
Job turnover rate 21.1 22.95
Economy-wide unemployment rate 9.99 9.87
Informal self-employment rate 17.79 20.68
Log wage gap (90th versus 10th percentile) 1.43 1.51
* Pre-liberalization data cover 1986-88 period for tari⁄s, 1978-91 for job turnover, 1988-91 for the
unemployment rate, 1986-90 for wage inequality, and 1986-90 for informal sector self-employment. Post
reform data are for 1992-98, 1992-99, 1992-98, 1992-99, 1992-98 periods, respectively. The tari⁄ data come
from Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), Table 1a. Job turnover ￿gures are based on DANE￿ s annual
industrial survey, which covers all manufacturing establishments with at least 10 workers. The log wage
distribution is based on the residuals from a Mincerian regression of log wages on education, age, and
sectoral and occupational dummies. The data set pools biennial household survey data from Colombia￿ s
national statistical agency (DANE) for the period 1986-98. Coe¢ cients on all variables are allowed to shift
through time in order to exclude changing skill premiums as a source of dispersion. The informal self
employment rate is constructed from the same data base. It is the fraction of the work force that is
self-employed, non-professional, and informal (i.e., not paying social security). Finally, ￿ring costs are based
on Figure 5 in Heckman and Pages (2004).
annual industrial survey. Note that the revenue function (9) and CES preferences imply that
log revenues (gross of ￿xed exporting costs) can be written as a function of employment,
















￿dH + 1]; (27)
and an indicator for whether ￿rm i is an exporter, Ix
it:









Further, assuming that ln(z) follows an exogenous AR(1) process,
lnzit = ￿lnzit￿1 + ￿it; (29)
19equation (28) can be restated as:























If we could obtain consistent estimates of the coe¢ cients that appear on the right-hand-






; and var(￿). However, selection bias and simultaneity bias prevent us from consis-
tently estimating (30) with ordinary least squares. The former problem occurs because by
(15), ￿rms choose whether to exit the market partly on the basis of their current productivity
levels, so the ￿it realizations observed for active producers are not random draws from the
unconditional distribution of ￿￿ s. The latter problem occurs because ￿rms￿current exporting
decisions and employment levels are chosen after the current realization on ￿ is observed, so ￿it
is correlated with both Ix
it and lnlit: Appendix 3 develops a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator related to Olley and Pakes￿(1996) that deals with both problems.
Applying this estimator to the set of all Colombian manufacturing plants observed for at
least three years during the pre-liberalization period 1982 and 1991, we obtain the results
summarized in Table 1 below.15 Since ￿ is not identi￿ed separately from ￿, we ￿xed this
parameter at a value typical of the literature: ￿ = 5: All remaining parameters are estimated
with considerable precision. It should be noted, however, that the estimates are sensitive
to choice of the instrument set, and to the weights we used on di⁄erent types of workers￿
managers, technicians, skilled laborers, unskilled workers, and apprentices￿ when constructing
the number of "e⁄ective" workers.16
15The data are annual observations on all manufacturing ￿rms with at least 10 workers. They were collected
by Colombia￿ s National Statistics Department (DANE) and cleaned as described in Roberts (1996). Given
that ￿xed capital and intermediate inputs do not appear in our model, we de￿ne revenue to be the value of
output net of intermediate input and capital costs. Annual capital costs are 10 percent of the book value of
￿rms￿capital stocks.
16The weights used for reported estimates are based on cross-plant mean wage premiums for each type of
employee, relative to unskilled workers. Weighting means (using plant size as weights) yields a larger ￿ value,
although it has little e⁄ect on ￿:
20Table 2: Estimates for the Revenue Function and Productivity Process*
Parameter Estimate Std. error z-ratio
￿ 0.592 0.057 10.41
￿ 0.848 0.007 118.73
￿2
" 1.668 0.042 39.54
dH 1.682 0.047 35.78
dF 0.213 0.004 51.31
* GMM estimates, given ￿ = 5
Table 3: Parameters Fixed Before Simulating Moments
Parameter Value Description Source
￿ 0.592 production function GMM estimate (Table 2)
￿ 0.848 persistence of z process GMM estimate (Table 2)
￿" 1.291 std. dev. of shocks to z GMM estimate (Table 2)
k￿DF 635.6 foreign demand level from GMM estimates (Table 2)
￿c 2.50 iceberg trade costs Eaton and Kortum (2003)
￿ 0.5 bargaining power assumed (literature)
￿ 5 elasticity of substitution assumed (literature)
r 0.15 discount rate Bond, et al (2008)
￿ 1.27 elasticity of matching function den Haan et al (2000)
4.3 Remaining Parameters
We ￿x several parameters using external sources. First, the real borrowing rate in Colombia
￿ uctuated around 15 percent between late 1980s and early 2000s, so we set r to be 0.15 (Bond
et al, 2008). Second, following den Haan, Ramey and Ramey (2000), we set the elasticity of
the matching function, ￿; to be 1.27. Third, as is common in the labor literature, we give
equal bargaining power to ￿rms and workers, setting ￿ = 0:5: Finally, we set iceberg trade
costs at ￿c￿1 = 1:50 since Eaton and Kortum (2003) ￿nd that the tari⁄equivalent of iceberg
costs falls between 123 percent and 174 percent. This ￿c value, along with our estimates for
dF and dH; implies DH and k￿DF:17
Table 3 collects the parameter values discussed thus far, and implies that 10 parameters
remain to be determined: the cost of creating a new ￿rm, ce; the ￿xed cost of operation, cp;
the ￿xed cost of exporting, cx, the value of informal sector production, b; the ￿ring cost in
terms of service sector goods, cf; the initial size of new ￿rms, le, the share of di⁄erentiated
17Equations (26), (27), and (10) imply exp(dF) = (1￿￿0)￿1; so we can impute ￿0 from the estimated value
of dF. Substituting this value into exp(dH) = D
1=￿
H (1￿￿0)(￿￿1)=￿ yields DH; given ￿ and the estimated value
of dH: Finally, given a value for ￿c; k￿DF follows from (10):
21goods in total expenditures, ￿, and the parameters of the vacancy cost function, (ch;￿1;￿2):
We estimate these parameters using the simulated method of moments and 14 targets that
summarize key features of our model: the ￿rm exit rate, the job turnover rate, the fraction
of ￿rms that export, the unemployment rate plus the informality rate, ￿ring cost (in terms
of years of wages), the autocorrelation of ￿rms employment levels, correlation between ￿rms￿
productivity and employment, and the employment growth rates among expanding ￿rms at
the di⁄erent quintiles of the size distribution and the share of workers in the service sector.18
Our solution algorithm is summarized in Appendix 4.
While it is not possible to associate individual parameters with individual statistics, exper-
iments do suggest that particular statistics play relatively key roles in identifying particular
parameters. First, the fraction of ￿rms that export is sensitive to ￿xed exporting costs, cx; and
the rate of ￿rm turnover is very responsive to the per-period ￿xed costs of operating a busi-
ness, cp. Second, the quintile-speci￿c job growth rates and the aggregate labor turnover rate
are responsive to the parameters of the vacancy cost function (ch;￿1;￿2); with cross-quintile
di⁄erences governed by the scale economies parameter, ￿2 and (for the smallest quintile) the
initial size of new ￿rms, le: Third, the share of workers in the service sector responds to the
share of service goods in total expenditures, ￿: Fourth, ￿ring cost parameter cf determines
average ￿ring costs in terms of years of wages. Finally, the unemployment/informality rate is
very responsive to the productivity of informal sector workers, b.
Table 4 reports the data-based statistics we use for calibration and their model-based
simulated counterparts. Although we are using 10 parameters to try to match 14 statistics,
the model does a nice job of ￿tting the data overall.19 In particular, the model captures the
18We do not calibrate to measures of wage dispersion because it is not possible for us to completely control for
di⁄erences in worker characteristics when constructing data-based measures of wage heterogeneity and arrive
at a measure of residual wage inequality. Interestingly, however, as will become evident in our discussion of
policy experiments, our model economy is able to generate a high level of wage inequality within a labor search
framework. This is traceable to the low job ￿nding rate in our benchmark economy (about 12% per year),
since with a low job ￿nding rate workers are willing to take low wages. As noted by Hornstein, Krusell and
Violante (2009), the standard search models deliver low wage inequality (compared to data) when they are
calibrated to the high job ￿nding rates observed in the U.S.
19The metric of ￿t we used was the average j1 ￿ Yi=Xij where Xi is the ith data-based statistics and Yi is
the corresponding model-based statistic. At its minimized value, this metric was 0.087.
22Table 4: Calibration: Data-based versus Simulated Statistics*
Industry-wide Employment Growth
Statistics Data Model Rates, by Quintile Data Model
Firm exit rate 0.091 0.079 <20th percentile 0.319 0.344
Job turnover 0.211 0.222 20th-40th percentile 0.218 0.214
Share of ￿rms exporting 0.120 0.145 40th-60th percentile 0.191 0.181
Unemployment +informality rate 0.278 0.288 60th-80th percentile 0.183 0.165
Share of workers in S sector 0.550 0.570 >80th percentile 0.157 0.135





* The ￿rm exit rate and the fraction of ￿rms that export are calculated from Colombian plant level data for
the pre-liberalization period, 1978-91. These data were collected by the Colombian National Administrative
Department of Statistics (DANE) in its Annual Manufacturer Survey (EAM), which covers all
establishments with at least 10 workers. The quintile-speci￿c rates of job creation and the statistics corr(l,l￿ )
and corr(z,l) are based on the same data base and time period, using the technology estimates in Table 2 to
calculate z. The job turnover rate is calculated from the Inter-American Development Bank￿ s Job Flows
Data Set for the 1978-1992 period, which in turn is based on the EAM. The unemployment rate is taken
from Inter-American Development Bank (2004), and is based on DANE￿ s biennial National Household
Survey (ENH). The share of workers in the service sector and the informality rate are also calculated from
the ENH, de￿ning an informal sector worker to be someone who does not pay social security, is
self-employed, has no employees, and is doing neither professional/technical nor managerial work. The ￿ring
cost in years of wages is based on Heckman and Pages (2004).
contributions of ￿rm entry/exit and intra-￿rm size adjustments to overall job turnover, the
persistence in employment levels, the overall unemployment rate, and higher job turnover rate
among small ￿rms.
Note that we use the sum of unemployment and informal self-employment as our data
target. Since Colombia does not have an unemployment insurance system, it is common for
unemployed workers to be self-employed at jobs with low entry costs (such as street vending)
and keep searching for a salaried job. As a result, ￿ ows from informal self-employment into
formal employment are substantial compared to ￿ ows from unemployment.20
Table 5 reports the parameter values associated with the calibration. Those expressed in
monetary units are measured in terms of the 1990 average annual wage for a service sector
worker, taken from the annual household survey. This ￿gure amounted to roughly $1,300 US
(1977), or about $4,500 current US dollars. Accordingly, our model implies that the costs
20Bosch and Maloney (2007) describe gross worker ￿ ows in the presence of informal labor markets in the
context of Mexico, a country with a similar institutional setup.
23Table 5: Calibrated Parameter Values*
Parameter Value Description
cp 30.87 ￿xed cost of operation
ch 2.11 posting cost scalar
cx 16.91 ￿xed exporting cost
b 0.72 value of home production
￿1 2.32 convexity, vacancy cost function
￿2 0.30 scale e⁄ect, vacancy cost function
￿ 0.50 share of Q goods in total spending
le 3.82 initial size, entering ￿rms
ce 281.96 entry cost for new ￿rms
cf 1.60 ￿ring cost in service sector goods
* Based on method of simulated moments.
of creating a new ￿rm are about $1,267,000, the ￿xed costs of operating a business amount
to about $139,000, and the ￿xed costs of exporting are about $76,000. Note also that those
who end up working in the informal sector take about a 28 percent wage cut relative to what
they could have earned if they had committed to working for a service sector ￿rm. Finally,
the parameters of the vacancy cost function imply both short-run convexities (￿1 = 2:32) and
modest scale economies (￿2 = 0:30).21
21Our of ￿1 is consistent with the available evidence on hiring cost convexities (e.g. Merz and Yashiv (2007),
and Yashiv (2006)). We also come close to satisfying the relationship ￿2 = 1￿1=￿1 implied by Nilsena et al￿ s
(2007) speci￿cation.
244.4 Simulated E⁄ects of Openness and Firing Costs
4.4.1 Tari⁄ Reductions
We are now prepared to examine the e⁄ects of trade reforms in our calibrated model. To do so
we reduce the import tari⁄from 21 percent to 11 percent, mimicking the reforms documented
in Table 1. This reduction in protection puts downward pressure on the domestic sales of
Q-sector ￿rms. But it also induces a real currency devaluation through the balanced trade
condition and thereby increases the optimal export share ￿ (by equation 10) and the fraction
of ￿rms that export. As in Melitz￿ s (2003) model, this export expansion is concentrated among
large ￿rms, so the right-hand tail of the ￿rm size distribution becomes more skewed (Table
6).
Three forces link tari⁄ rates to labor market outcomes. First, as tari⁄ reductions shift
the size distribution in favor of large ￿rms, they concentrate employment at ￿rms that can
exploit scale economies in vacancy posting. Second, this same shift in the size distribution
concentrates production at ￿rms that experience relatively small productivity shocks, since
the estimated productivity process is mean-reverting.22 Finally, tari⁄ reductions move the
threshold output level for exporting, and thus change the number and type of ￿rms that
adjust their exporting status in response to productivity shocks. This matters because ￿rms
that cross this threshold make larger percentage-wise employment adjustments than they
would have if exporting had never been an attractive option.
Tables 6 and 7 show that the second e⁄ect is dominant. Tari⁄reductions shift jobs toward
larger ￿rms, and as this happens job turnover declines by several points. Further, because
this means less worker displacement, the rate of unemployment/informality falls. Finally,
because fewer jobs are located at ￿rms that wish to rapidly expand after the tari⁄ reduction,
there are fewer ￿rms willing to pay very high wages. This translates into less wage dispersion
and lower average wages. In sum, contrary to popular belief, our simulations suggest that
tari⁄ reductions in isolation tend to reduce job turnover and wage inequality.23 The results
22Since z0 ￿ z = (￿ ￿ 1)z + ￿; E(z0 ￿ zjz) is a negative monotonic function of z for 0 < ￿ < 1:
23Our results on wage inequality also contrast with those of other recent models of trade with heterogeneous
25Table 6: Size Distribution E⁄ects of Trade Costs and Firing Costs
Base Case Reductions in
Tari⁄s and Tari⁄s and
Tari⁄s Firing Costs Firing Costs Iceberg Costs
Tari⁄s (￿m) 1.21 1.11 1.21 1.11 1.11
Iceberg costs (￿c) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.19
Firing costs (cf) 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.20 1.60
20th percentile 14.9 15.5 11.2 14.4 16.4
40th percentile 31.4 32.3 22.5 29.6 32.2
60th percentile 62.8 63.0 48.6 49.8 69.5
80th percentile 105.0 131.1 90.9 90.1 104.0
Table 7: The Labor Market E⁄ects of Trade Costs and Firing Costs
Base Case Reductions in
Tari⁄s and Tari⁄s and
Tari⁄s Firing costs Firing Costs Iceberg Costs
Tari⁄s (￿m) 1.21 1.11 1.21 1.11 1.11
Iceberg costs (￿c) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.19
Firing costs (cf) 1.60 1.60 1.20 1.20 1.60
Share of ￿rms exporting 0.145 0.176 0.143 0.164 0.237
Job turnover 0.222 0.199 0.231 0.239 0.196
Unemployment/informality 0.284 0.262 0.311 0.319 0.263
Log 90-10 wage ratio 2.033 1.789 2.055 2.066 1.902
Share labor in Q sector 0.429 0.425 0.444 0.452 0.419
Wage dispersion, Q sector 0.800 0.755 0.854 0.812 0.796
Average wage, Q sector 1.829 1.753 1.928 1.940 1.780
do, however, suggest that trade liberalization eliminated jobs at the high end of the wage
distribution and in that sense imposed a cost on workers.
4.4.2 Firing Costs
We next investigate the e⁄ects of ￿ring reductions on job turnover and wage inequality. To
begin, consider the e⁄ects of reducing these costs by 25 percent, per Table 1, holding the tari⁄
rate at its pre-reform level. Relative to the pre-reform equilibrium, ￿rms with low employment
and high current productivity react by hiring more workers, while large, ine¢ cient ￿rms shed
labor. This is shown in Figure 3, which reports the absolute changes in employment levels,
L(z0;l); associated with lower ￿ring costs.
These adjustments concentrate employment among smaller ￿rms which, as discussed above,
￿rms and search frictions. In those models liberalization increases pro￿ts for exporting ￿rms and reduces
pro￿ts for others. This spread in the pro￿t distribution is passed back to workers, who share in ￿rms￿rents
through bargaining. Relevant references include Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), Helpman et al, (2010), Egger
and Kreickemeier (2007), Amiti and Davis (2008), Davis and Harrigan (2008), Felbermayr et al (2008).
26are relatively volatile (Table 6, column 3 versus column 1). Further, as is standard in many
search and matching models (e.g., Ljungqvist (2002) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)),
lower ￿ring costs increase the value of reallocating labor. Combined, the size distribution ef-
fect and the reduction in market frictions drive up the turnover rate by about one percentage
point (Table 7, column 3).
Finally, the higher turnover rate also leads to more rents among expanding ￿rms, increasing
the average wage. This entices more workers to search for Q-sector jobs (as in Harris and
Todaro 1970) and, in combination with the higher rate of job turnover, drives up the rate of
informality/unemployment by 3 percentage points. So Colombia￿ s ￿ring cost reduction, taken
by itself, goes part way toward explaining the changes in labor market conditions Colombia
experienced during the 1990s.
4.4.3 The Reform Package
Now consider the combined e⁄ects of reduced tari⁄s and reduced ￿ring costs, i.e., the reform
package that Colombia implemented circa 1990s. Interestingly, although tari⁄ reductions in
isolation reduce turnover, tari⁄ reductions in combination with ￿ring cost reductions amplify
turnover (Table 7, column 4). The reason is that reductions in ￿ring costs make employment
and output more responsive to productivity shocks, and thereby increase the set of ￿rms
that cross the threshold between exporting and non-exporting in a typical period. That is,
reductions in ￿ring costs make the third linkage between tari⁄s and labor market outcomes
(discussed above) more important. The same interaction e⁄ects between tari⁄ reductions
and ￿ring costs lead to a larger informal sector than Colombia would have experienced if it
had implemented a reduction in ￿ring costs alone. However, reductions in tari⁄s do little to
dampen the e⁄ects of reduced ￿ring costs on average wages and wage dispersion.
Overall, our simulations of the Colombian reform package account for much of the observed
transformation in labor market conditions during the 1990s (Table 7, column 4). The model
predicts an increase in turnover rates by 1.8 percentage points relative to the base case,
27while the data show an increase of 1.9 percentage points. The model predicts an increase
in unemployment and informality by 3.5 percentage points, while the data show an increase
of 2.8 percentage points. Finally, the model predicts an increase in the 90-10 wage ratio by
3.3 percentage points, while the data predict an increase of 8 percentage points. Thus, while
other factors surely mattered, the linkages captured by our model by themselves provide a
fairly comprehensive explanation for the labor market adjustments of interest.
Colombia￿ s ￿ring cost reductions were partly motivated by a desire to help domestic ￿rms
become competitive in global markets, so it is interesting to ask whether they encouraged
exporting. According to our model the answer is: yes and no. Small to mid-size ￿rms drawing
positive productivity shocks were more likely to take on the extra labor needed to become
exporters after ￿ring costs fell. This is re￿ ected in Figure 4, which shows the changes in the
export indicator function Ix(z;l) induced by the reform package. (Recall that this function
takes a value of 1 for ￿rms that starts exporting and 0 for others.) On the other hand, large
￿rms with mediocre productivity carried excessive labor when ￿ring costs were high, and
they used this labor to generate export revenue. Once ￿ring costs were reduced, these large
unproductive ￿rms shed some of their excess workers and cut back or eliminated their foreign
sales (Those that did the latter show a change in Ix(z;l) of -1 in Figure 4.)
4.4.4 Iceberg Costs
Our simulations imply that Colombia￿ s reform package increased the share of ￿rms that export
by about 2 percentage points. But this share actually rose from an average of 12 percent for
the period 1984-1990 to 18.2 percent in 1991 and 23.5 percent by 1996. Thus, at the same
time that tari⁄s and ￿ring costs were falling, it is likely that other forces were encouraging
trade, including reductions in transport costs and protection rates among trading partners.
To approximate the e⁄ects of these other trade-inducing forces, our ￿nal exercise is to
consider reductions in iceberg costs by an amount su¢ cient to induce a 9 pecentage point
increase in the share of ￿rms who export. The rightmost column in Tables 6 and 7 reports the
28associated changes in the plant size distributions and labor market aggregates, respectively.
As expected, reductions in iceberg costs make imported varieties cheaper, causing ￿rms to
contract their domestic sales and induce more ￿rms to export. However, unlike in the ￿m
experiment, Melitzian forces do not dominate the shift in the ￿rm size distribution here.
The reason appears to be that, unlike in Melitz￿ s (2003) model, size and productivity are not
monotonically related to one another in our setting. Since hiring and ￿ring costs prevent ￿rms
from rapidly adjusting their ￿rm size in response to productivity shocks, some ￿rms with few
workers are very productive. And when trade costs fall su¢ ciently, many of these ￿rms are
added to the ranks of exporters. (Modest reductions in trade costs￿ i.e., those associated
with reductions in ￿m alone￿ do not entice small e¢ cient ￿rms into exporting because the
associated increment to their pro￿ts falls short of ￿xed exporting costs.)
4.4.5 Welfare E⁄ects of the Reforms
Overall, our simulations imply that the reforms increased average welfare by only 0.3 percent.
However, some Q-sector workers were a⁄ected much more dramatically, and their fates de-
pended upon their employer￿ s characteristics. To summarize these welfare e⁄ects we present
three ￿gures, each depicting the change in Je(z;l) associated with a particular reform. (Re-
call that Je(z;l) is the value of starting a period matched with a ￿rm in state z;l.) Figure 5
depicts the change associated with the tari⁄ reduction from ￿m = 1:21 to ￿m = 1:11; Figure
6 depicts the change associated with the reduction in ￿ring costs from cf = 1:6 to cf = 1:2;
and Figure 7 depicts the change associated with both reductions at once. When interpreting
the magnitudes of the changes, it is useful to keep in mind that the value of being in the
unemployed state is 1=r = 6:67 for all workers.
For reductions in ￿m alone, workers at small ￿rms do worse (as re￿ ected in negative
numbers in Figure 5), workers at large, high productivity ￿rms do better, and all others are
una⁄ected. This is essentially because most small employers face new import competition but
don￿ t have su¢ ciently high productivity to bene￿t from export markets. For reductions in cf
29alone, it is productivity rather than size that matters most, since low ￿ring costs increase the
incentives for high productivity ￿rms to expand by o⁄ering high wages, while low productivity
￿rms pay employees their reservation wage regardless of cf. Finally, the actual reform package
created a mixture of these forces, with workers at small, low productivity ￿rms losing the most
and workers at large, high productivity ￿rms gaining the most.
5 Summary
In Latin America, globalization and labor market reforms have been associated with less job
security, more wage inequality, and more informality. We formulate a dynamic structural
model that explains these patterns of association as a consequence of interactions between the
policy reforms, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, exporting incentives, and scale economies
in hiring workers. Simulations of our model imply that by themselves, tari⁄ reductions are
unlikely to have caused the deterioration in labor market conditions that Colombia experienced
during the 1990s. However, reductions in ￿ring costs and tari⁄s interact with one another, and
together go some way toward explaining observed increases in job turnover, wage dispersion
and informality.
In addition to providing a lens through which to interpret recently-observed changes in
Latin American labor markets, our paper makes several methodological contributions. First, it
generalizes the representation of labor markets with multi-worker ￿rms developed by Bertola
and Caballero (1994) to an open economy setting with fully articulated product markets,
multiple sectors, and continuous Markov processes for productivity shocks. Second, it demon-
strates how to quantify some welfare and distributional e⁄ects of openness and ￿ring costs that
had not yet been empirically explored. Finally, we have developed a means to characterize
plant-level productivity processes that does not require us to observe a measure of physical
output, matches a large set of stylized facts, and is robust with respect to simultaneity bias
and selection bias.
30Appendix 1: The Wage Functions
Hiring Wages In order to characterize wages in hiring ￿rms, we ￿rst determine the total
surplus for a ￿rm and a worker that are matched in the end-of-period state (z0;l0): At the














Note that at the time of bargaining, the vacancy posting and matching process are over and
the costs of vacancy postings are sunk. As a result, if the bargaining fails, the ￿rm is simply
left with less workers. The surplus that a marginal worker generates consists of two parts:
the current increase in the ￿rms￿pro￿ts, i.e. marginal revenue product net of wages, and the
increment to the value of being in state (z0;l0) at the start of the next period. If the ￿rm
does not exit next period, i.e. if V(z0;l0) > 0; the marginal worker will have a positive only
if the ￿rm expands. Otherwise, the ￿rm will incur the dismissal cost cf. If the ￿rm exits, its
expected marginal value from the current marginal hire will be zero.
Similarly, the surplus for the marginal worker who is matched by a hiring ￿rm in the
















where the worker enjoys wh(z0;l0) in the current period, and starts next period in a ￿rm with
the beginning-of-period state (z0;l0): Since at the time of bargaining the vacancy posting and
matching process are over, if the bargaining fails, the worker is unemployed this period and
starts next period in state o:
The worker and ￿rm split the total surplus by Nash bargaining where the bargaining power
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continuation value of employment at a (z0;l0)-type ￿rm net of the continuation value of un-
employment. Weighted by (1 ￿ ￿); this latter term cancels with ￿
@V(z0;l0)
@l0 ; which appears on
the left hand side of equation (31), since the worker gets the fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of any future
rents from the match while the ￿rm gets ￿. In event of a contraction, the ￿rm cannot enforce
contracts that stipulate laid-o⁄ workers must pay their share of ￿ring costs. Thus, worker￿ s
share of expected ￿ring costs, ￿Pf(z0;l0)cf; is subtracted from wages in the current period.












































































the wage schedule for expanding ￿rms is given by
wh(z
0;l




















Firing Wages To derive the ￿ring wage schedule, we begin by writing the value of employ-
















where l0 = L(z0;l): This expression re￿ ects the fact that workers who are not ￿red are paid







0) = (1 + r)J
u;









Note that as a hiring ￿rmincreases its employment level toward the point at which ￿firm(z0;l0) =
0, the hiring wage approaches wf(z0;l0) by (31).
33Appendix 2: Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium for a small open economy consists of a measure of domestic dif-
ferentiated goods NH; an exact price index for composite good P; an aggregate quantity index
for composite good Q, aggregate income I; a measure of workforce in services LS; a measure
of unemployed workers in di⁄erentiated goods sector Lu; unemployment rate in di⁄erentiated
goods sector ￿u; job ￿nding rate ￿w; vacancy ￿lling rate ￿f; the exit rate ￿exit; the fraction
of ￿rms exporting ￿x; the measure of entrants M; the value functions and associated policy
functions V(z;l); L(z;l); Ih (z;l); Ic(z;l); Ix (z;l;k);Jo;Ju;Js; and Je; the wage schedules
wh(z;l) and wf(z;l); exchange rate k, and end-of-the period and interim distributions f(z;l)
and e f(z;l) such that
1. Steady State Distributions: In equilibrium, f(z;l) and e f(z0;l) reproduce themselves
through the Markov processes on z, the policy functions and the productivity draws
upon entry. In order to de￿ne the interim distribution, e f(z;l); let e e f(z0;l) be the interim
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where I(L(z0;l);l0) is an indicator function with I(L(z0;l);l0) = 1 if L(z0;l) = l0:
2. Market Clearance in Sector S: Demand for the S￿sector goods comes from two
sources: consumers spend a (1 ￿ ￿) fraction of aggregate income I on it, and ￿rms
demand it to pay their ￿xed operation costs, ￿xed exporting costs, labor adjustment







Market clearance condition in this sector is then given by
LS + b￿uLQ = (1 ￿ ￿)I + NH(c + cp + ￿xcx) + Mce;
where LS and LQ are the size of the workforce in the two sectors, and ￿u is the unem-
ployment rate within the Q-sector.
3. Labor Market Clearing: With a normalized measure of workers, the size of the work-
force in the Q-sector is LQ = 1￿LS: Total production employment in the di⁄erentiated
good sector is given by













is the average employment in di⁄rentiated goods sector. The measure of unemployed
workers is then
Lu = LQ ￿ EQ = ￿uLQ:
The equilibrium condition for the labor market in the Q￿sector requires that ￿ ows out
of employment equal the ￿ ows into employment. Every period, a fraction ￿l of workers














Then, the equilibrium ￿ ow condition is
￿uLQ￿w = (1 ￿ ￿u)LQ￿l;





On vacancies side, the aggregate number of vacancies in this economy is given by





























The total number of vacancies, V; together with Lu = ￿uLQ; determines matching
probabilities ￿f(V;Lu) and ￿w(V;Lu) that ￿rms and workers take as given.
4. Firm turnover: In equilibrium, there is a positive mass of entry M every period so
that the free entry condition (16) holds with equality. The fraction of ￿rms exiting is








and measure of exits equals that of entrants,
M = ￿exitNH:













F(n)dn = DH [￿m￿ck]
1￿￿ ;











Tari⁄ revenues collected by the home country government amount to T =
EF
￿m(￿m ￿ 1):
We assume all tari⁄revenues are returned to worker/consumers in the form of lump-sum









and since service goods are non-traded, balanced trade obtains when
EF
￿m = SF: The
exchange rate k moves to ensure that this condition holds. Balanced trade ensures that
national income matches national expenditure.
6. Workers are indi⁄erent between taking a certain job in the undi⁄erentiated sector and
searching a job in industrial sector: Jo = Js = Ju:
37Appendix 3: Estimating the Revenue Function
and Productivity Process
The Revenue Function The equation we wish to estimate is:
lnsit = ￿lnsit￿1 + (dH + I
x























But selection bias and simultaneity bias prevent us from consistently estimating this expression
with ordinary least squares. The former problem occurs because ￿rms choose whether to shut
down partly on the basis of their ￿it realizations, and the latter problem occurs because
￿rms￿current exporting decisions (Ix
it) and employment levels (lit) depend upon their current
productivity levels.
Selection Bias and Identi￿cation To deal with these problems, let Ic
it be an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the ith ￿rm continues to operate in period t, and 0 otherwise.






; the revenue function can be re-
formulated as:
lnsit = ￿lnsit￿1 + dH(1 ￿ ￿) + dF(I
x


















where the error term ￿it has zero mean and is orthogonal to lnsit￿1, ln‘it￿1, Ix
it￿1, and
E [￿itjIc
it = 1;:::]: Also, although it is correlated with current exporting decisions (Ix
it); ￿it







: These implications of our model can be
used as the basis for a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that identi￿es the
38parameters of equation (A3.1).24 And the e¢ ciency of this estimator can be improved by
exploiting the moment condition E
￿
Ix
it(1 ￿ e￿dF) ￿ xit
￿
= 0, where Ix
it(1￿e￿dF) is the share
of exports in total sales implied by our model and xit is the observed ratio of export revenues
to total sales, which we treat as a noisy measure of true export intensity.







To this end, recall that there is a threshold productivity level above which all ￿rms with
beginning-of-period employment level ‘it￿1 will continue operating. Denoting this threshold
productivity level g￿(‘it￿1); the continuation condition is lnzit = ￿lnzit￿1 + ￿it > g￿(‘it￿1).
Or, since lnzit￿1 = ￿
￿￿1
￿
lnsit￿1 ￿ (dH + Ix
it￿1dF)
￿








it￿1); and the probability of continuation
can be calculated as
p
C







where ￿it ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) and ￿() is the standard normal cumulative distribution. Treating g(￿) as
a ￿ exible function of its arguments, it follows that pC
it values can be imputed from estimates
of the probit function (A3.3), and the conditional expectation of interest can be calculated



































is the relevant Mills ratio and ￿() = ￿0( ).








For this, note that ￿rms above some threshold productivity level will choose to export, given
24Identi￿cation further requires that these conditional expectations be non-linear functions of their argu-
ments and/or that they condition on additional arguments that do not appear in equation (A3.2). Note that
the dependence of ln‘it on ￿it does not prevent us from obtaining consistent estimates of these parameters
because the coe¢ cient on ln‘it can be inferred from the coe¢ cients on ln‘it￿1 and lnrit￿1.
25When estimating this probit, we use a ￿ exible (translog) functional form for g(rit￿1;lit￿1;IX
it￿1):





















it is the probability that ￿rm i exports in period t and h(sit￿1;lit￿1;Ix
it￿1) is a ￿ exible
function of its arguments.26 Hence E [Ix
itjIc
it = 1;:::] can be calculated by estimating the
probit (A3.4) and retrieving the imputed pX
it values. Clearly, identi￿cation here comes from
the non-linear form of the probit function.27
The Moment Conditions To summarize, our GMM estimator is based on the moment
conditions:





it] = 0; E[￿it] = 0;E[￿
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￿;dX; and dH can be estimated using the approach sketched above, ￿
and ￿ are not separately identi￿ed. We therefore set ￿ = 5, a value typical of the literature,
and generate estimates for the remaining parameters. (Refer to Table 1 in the text.) Our
results proved not to be sensitive to the inclusion of time dummies in A1.1. Accordingly, since
26It is interesting that lagged exports help predict current exports here, even though we have assumed away
sunk entry costs. The reason is that, by (28), lagged exports help to explain lagged productivity.
27Olley and Pakes (1996) develop a related strategy that posits a determinstic linkage between productivity
shocks and investment levels. This allows them to get away from functional form as a basis for identi￿cation,
but it is not an available option in the present setting.
40our theoretical model presumes that the macro environment is stable, we focus our attention
on the case in which they are omitted. As noted in section 4.2, however, the results did prove
to be sensitive to the way in which our labor measure is constructed and to as the instrument
set.
41Appendix 4: Numerical Solution Algorithm
We begin our solution algorithm with exogenous values for ￿;￿m; DF; and r, thereby im-
mediately determining Jo = 1=r: To compute the value functions, we discretize the state space
on a log scale using 500 grid points for employment and 50 grid points for productivity. We
set the maximum ￿rm size as 7,500 workers and numerically check that this is not restrictive.
In steady state, a negligible fraction of ￿rms reach this size. We then:
1. Formulate guesses for cf;DH; wf(z;l);￿ and ￿f: Calculate wh(z;l) using equation (24).
2. Given DH; wf(z;l);￿, ￿f and wh(z;l) calculate the value function for the ￿rm, V(z;l);
using equation (12) and ￿nd the associated decision rules for exit, hiring and exporting.
Calculate the expected value of entry, Ve; using equation (16). Compare Ve with ce: If
Ve > ce; decrease DH (to make entry less valuable) and if Ve < c; increase DH (to make
entry more valuable): Go back to Step 1 with the updated value of DH and repeat until
DH converges.
3. Given wf(z;l);￿, ￿f and the converged value of DH from Step 2; update wf(z;l). To do
this, ￿rst calculate Je(z0;l0) using equations (20) and (23), and imposing the equilibrium
condition Ju = Jo: Given Je(z;l); update ￿ring wage schedule using equation (25).
Compare the updated ￿ring wage schedule with the initial guess. If they are not close
enough go back to Step 1 with the new ￿ring wage schedule and repeat Steps 1 to 3 until
wf converges. Note that if ￿ring wages are too high, then Je(z;l); the value of being
in a ￿rm at the start of a period, is high, since the ￿rm is less likely to ￿re workers. A
high value of Je(z;l), however, lower ￿ring wages. Similarly, if the ￿ring wages are too
low, then Je is low, which pushed ￿ring wages up.
4. Given ￿f, the converged value of DH from Step 2; the converged value of wf(z;l) from
Step 3, calculate the trade balance. In order to do this:
42(a) Given ￿rms decisions, calculate f(z;l) and e f(z;l), the stationary probability dis-
tributions over (z;l) at the end and interim states, respectively.
(b) Given e f(z;l); calculate average number of vacancies and the average employment
in di⁄erentiated goods sector using equations (34) and (33).
(c) Take a guess for NH: Given NH and v, calculate the mass of unemployed Lu in








which is one equation in one unknown. Given NH;l and Lu ; calculate the size of
the workforce in the Q-sector is LQ from
NHl = LQ ￿ Lu:
Given NH; LS = 1￿LQ; M (mass of entrants); and I (aggregate income), check if
supply and demand is equal in the service sector
LS + b￿uLQ | {z }
supply
= (1 ￿ ￿)I + NH(c + cp + ￿xcx) + Mce | {z }
demand
;
If the supply is greater than the demand, decrease NH and if supply is less than
demand, increase NH: Repeat until NH converges. Repeat Step 4c until NH con-
verges.
(d) Given the value of NH from Step 4c, calculate exports and imports. If exports are
larger than imports, lower ￿ and if exports are less than imports, increase ￿: Go
back to Step 1 with the updated value of ￿; and repeat until convergence.
5. Given the converged value of DH from Step 2; the converged value of wf(z;l) from
Step 3, and the converged value of ￿ from Step 4, update ￿f: In order to do that, ￿rst
43calculate EJe
h using (20). Then ￿nd ￿w from





h and ￿w; calculate Ju using (18). If Jo > Ju; increase ￿f (to attract workers
to di⁄erentiated goods sector) and if Jo < Ju; we lower ￿f (to make the di⁄erentiated
goods sector less attractive). Go back to Step 2, and repeat until ￿f converges.
6. Calculate average wages in equilibrium. Check if cf is the right multiple of average
wages. If not, update cf and go back to Step 1.
Estimation Code The above algorithm solves the model for a given set of exogenous para-
meter values, including the cost of entry ce: When we estimate the benchmark model to obtain
parameter estimates, we: i) use the empirical value of ￿, ii) take the value of DH estimated in
the ￿rst stage where we estimate revenue function parameters, iii) set ce such that free entry
holds. This enables us to skip Step 2 and 4 in the calibration. When we do policy experiments
by varying the parameters related to trade costs, the values of DH and ￿ change endogenously,
so we use the complete algorithm to solve the model.
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